Cybersecurity Dynamics by Xu, Shouhuai
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
05
10
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 F
eb
 20
15
Cybersecurity Dynamics∗
Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at San Antonio
shxu@cs.utsa.edu
ABSTRACT
We explore the emerging field of Cybersecurity Dynamics, a can-
didate foundation for the Science of Cybersecurity.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]
General Terms
Security, Theory
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1. THE CONCEPT
In the course of seeking fundamental concepts that would drive
the study of cybersecurity for the many years to come — just like
how concepts such as confidentiality, integrity and availability have
been driving the study of security for decades — the idea of cy-
bersecurity dynamics emerged. Intuitively, cybersecurity dynamics
describes the evolution of global cybersecurity state as caused by
cyber attack-defense interactions. Figure 1 illustrates the evolu-
tion of cybersecurity state of a toy cyber system that has six nodes,
which can represent computers (but other resolutions are both pos-
sible and relevant). In this example, a node may be in one of two
states, secure (green color) or compromised (red color); a secure
node may become compromised and a compromised node may be-
come secure again, and so on. A red-colored node u pointing to a
red-colored node v means u successfully attacked v. Even if node
5 is not attacked by any other node at time t4, it still can become
compromised because of (e.g.) an insider attack launched by an au-
thorized user. A core concept in cybersecurity dynamics is attack-
defense structure, namely complex network capturing the relation
which computer can directly attack and/or defend for which other
computer in a cyber system of interest. This means that another
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emerging field, called Network Science, would play a fundamental
role in cybersecurity dynamics (as a supporting technology). From
this perspective, a vision related to cybersecurity dynamics was re-
cently independently explored by Kott [6].
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Figure 1: Illustration of cybersecurity dynamics in a toy cyber-
system, which has six nodes (denoted by 1, . . . , 6) whose states
evolve over time as caused by cyber attack-defense interactions.
A node has two states: secure (green color) and compromised
(red color). Dashed arrows represent successful attacks.
Cybersecurity dynamics can serve as a foundation for the Sci-
ence of Cybersecurity because of the following. First, cyber attacks
are inevitable and defenders need to know the dynamic cybersecu-
rity states so as to manage the risk (e.g., using appropriate threshold
cryptosystems or Byzantine fault-tolerance schemes). Cybersecu-
rity dynamics offers natural security metrics such as: What is the
probability that a node is compromised at time t? What is the (ex-
pected) number of nodes that are compromised at time t? Such
basic metrics can be used to define more advanced security/risk
metrics for decision-making purposes. Together they can be used
to characterize the global effect of deploying some defense tools
or mechanisms. Second, cybersecurity dynamics naturally leads
to the notion of macroscopic cybersecurity, where the model pa-
rameters abstract (e.g.) the power of microscopic attack/defense
mechanisms and security policies. The distinction between macro-
scopic security and microscopic security might help separate se-
curity services (i.e., management- or operation-oriented) from se-
curity techniques (i.e., design-oriented). Third, cybersecurity dy-
namics offers an overarching framework that can accommodate de-
scriptive, prescriptive, and predictive cybersecurity models, which
can be systematically studied by using various mathematical tech-
niques (broadly defined). For example, we can characterize the
cybersecurity phenomena exhibited by the dynamics and pin down
the factors/laws that govern the evolutions.
Cybersecurity dynamics vs. biological epidemic dynamics. Re-
searchers have been trying to design and build computer systems
that can mimic the elegant properties of biological (especially hu-
man body) systems, through concepts such as Artificial Immune
System [4]. Not surprisingly, the concept of cybersecurity dynam-
ics is inspired by epidemic models of biological systems [9]. The
concept is also inspired by models of interacting particle systems
[7], and by the microfoundation in economics (i.e., macroeconomic
parameters are ideally derived from, or the output of, some microe-
conomic models) [5]. Furthermore, the concept naturally general-
izes the many models that are scattered in a large amount of lit-
erature in venues including both statistical physics (e.g., [10]) and
computer science (e.g., [1, 13, 14]). However, as we will discuss
in Section 3, fully understanding and managing cybersecurity dy-
namics requires us to overcome several technical barriers.
2. RESEARCH ROADMAP
In order to fulfill the envisioned cybersecurity dynamics founda-
tion for the Science of Cybersecurity, we suggest a research roadmap
that consists of three integral thrusts.
Thrust I: Building a systematic theory of cybersecurity dynam-
ics. The goal is to understand cybersecurity dynamics via first-
principles modeling, by using as-simple-as-possible models with
as-few-as-possible parameters and making as-weak-as-possible as-
sumptions. Such models aim to derive macroscopic phenomena
or properties from microscopic cyber attack-defense interactions.
These studies can lead to cybersecurity laws of the following kind:
What is the outcome of the interaction between a certain class of
cyber defenses (including policies) and a certain class of cyber at-
tacks? The models may assume away how model parameters can
be obtained (obtaining the parameters is the focus of Thrust II), as
long as they are consistent with cyber attack and defense activi-
ties. Such characterization studies might additionally address the
following question: In order to obtain a certain kind of results, cer-
tain model parameters must be provided no matter how costly it is
to obtain them. Early-stage investigations falling into this Thrust
include [10, 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 8, 13, 15, 14],
Thrust II: Data-, policy-, architecture- and mechanism-driven
characterization studies. The goal is to characterize security poli-
cies, architectures and mechanisms from the perspective of cyber-
security dynamics. These studies allow us to extract model pa-
rameters for practical use of the cybersecurity insights/laws discov-
ered by Thrust I, so as to guide real-life cyber operation decision-
making. Data-driven cybersecurity analytics is relevant to all these
studies. For example, by studying the notion of stochastic cyber
attack process, it is possible to conduct “gray-box" (rather than
“black-box") predictions [16], which can serve as earlywarning in-
formation and guide the provisioning of resources for cost-effective
defense. This Thrust might lead to the development of cybersecu-
rity instruments, which can measure useful attributes — like the
various kinds of medical devices that can measure various health
attributes/parameters of human body.
Thrust III: Bridging gaps between Thrusts I & II. The goal is
to bridge the gaps between Thrust I and Thrust II. This Thrust can
inform Thrust II what parameters used in the models of Thrust I
are necessary to obtain, no matter how costly it is to obtain them.
On the other hand, this Thrust can also inform Thrust I that certain
other parameters may be easier to obtain in practice, and therefore
alternate models may be sought instead. Research on experimental
cybersecurity, in lieu of experimental physics, will be a main theme
of this Thrust.
3. TECHNICAL BARRIERS
In order to fulfill the envisioned cybersecurity dynamics founda-
tion for the Science of Cybersecurity, we need to overcome several
technical barriers that are believed to be inherent to the problem of
cybersecurity (i.e., they cannot be bypassed) and do not have coun-
terparts (at least to a large extent) in the inspiring disciplines men-
tioned above. Representatives are: (a) The scalability barrier: Sup-
pose there are n nodes, where each node has 2 states. Then, there
are 2n global states. This state-space explosion prevents simple
treatment of stochastic processes. (b) The nonlinearity barrier: The
probability that a computer is compromised would depend on the
states of other computers in a (highly) nonlinear fashion. This can
render many analysis techniques useless. (c) The dependence bar-
rier: The states of computers are dependent upon each other (e.g.,
they may have the same software vulnerability), and thus we need
to accommodate such dependence between them. (d) The struc-
tural dynamics barrier: The heterogeneous attack-defense complex
network structures may be dynamic at a time scale that may or may
not be the same as the time scale of the cybersecurity dynamics. (e)
The non-equilibrium (or transient behavior) barrier: It is important
to understand both the equilibrium states and the dynamics before
it converges to the equilibrium distribution/state (if it does at all).
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